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State v. Smith: Presumption of Husband's Coercion Over Wife
In North Carolina, a criminal act committed by a wife in the pres-
ence of her husband is presumed to have been compelled by her hus-
band's threats, commands or coercion; unless this presumption is
rebutted, the wife cannot be convicted.'
This common law doctrine of presumed coercion by a husband over
his wife, though uncertain in origin, has existed for over 1,000 years, as
noted by Blackstone, and was therefore deeply embedded in England's
law.2 Most authorities agree that the presumption arose out of the mar-
riage relation at a time when a woman had to remain totally obedient
to her husband, since the husband had complete control over the per-
son of his wife.'
Not only is the origin of the doctrine uncertain, the doctrine is itself a
curious one. As noted by one authority:
It was a curious rule because it was apparently peculiar to common-law
countries .... The origin, the limits, and the reasons for the rule are
all more or less obscure. The reason most commonly given, that the
wife should be excused because she acts in fear or out of affection for
her husband, would seem to apply in whole or large part to the rela-
tionship of parent and child, master and servant, overlord and retainer,
etc. But in none of these cases was mere coercion an excuse for crimi-
nal acts. Doubtless the common-law wished to encourage obedience by
the wife, but this policy applies to other relationships where obedience
has received no such reward. It is generally admitted that this com-
mon-law rule was illogical and artificial at the time of its origin.4
North Carolina's first encounter with this rule was in the 1871 case,
State v. Williams.' In this case the court stated that it was "more natu-
ral to suppose the principle to have been founded upon the fact that in
most cases the husband has actually an influence and authority over the
wife, which the law sanctions or at least recognizes. "6 In Williams, a
wife had been convicted of an assault and battery, but the jury was not
1. State v. Williams, 65 N.C. 398, 399 (1871).
2. 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *29.
3. IX WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2514 (3rd Ed. 1940); 1 JONES ON EVIDENCE § 3.75 (1972);
3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 165 (1971); 2 R. LEE, N.C. FAMILY LAW § 212 (1963).
4. 3 C. VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 165 (1971).
5. 65 N.C. 398 (1871).
6. Id. at 400. See, e.g., State v. Rhodes, 61 N.C. 453 (1868) (held a husband was not guilty
where he whipped his wife with a switch no larger than his thumb); and State v. Black, 60 N.C.
263 (1864) (held that a husband is allowed to use towards his wife such a degree of force as is
necessary to control an unruly temper and make her behave herself).
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instructed on the presumption of coercion by her husband. The
supreme court reversed the wife's conviction and held that if a wife
commits any felony (with certain exceptions)7 in the presence of her
husband, it is presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that
she acted under his constraint, and she cannot be convicted of the fel-
ony.8 In State v. Nowell,9 a husband and wife had been convicted of
abducting a fourteen year old girl. In this case, the court held the wife
had been given the benefit of the presumption where the jury had been
instructed on the doctrine as presented in Williams. In State v.
Seahorn,'" the court found that the lower court's charge, though not in
strict compliance with Williams and Nowell, was a substantial compli-
ance, and upheld the conviction of a husband and wife for a liquor law
violation. Chief Justice Clark, concurring in Seahorn, urged that the
presumption no longer comported with twentieth century conditions
and should be abolished." Yet, State v. Cauley"2 subsequently reaf-
firmed the doctrine of presumed coercion in a very brutal and gro-
tesque child-beating case. In State v. Robinson,'3 however, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held the presumption inapplicable where a
wife conspired to commit murder, finding this crime to be one of the
exceptions to which the presumption is inapplicable.' 4
The issue of presumed coercion was considered again by the North
Carolina Court of Appeals in the recent case, State v. Smith. 5 In
Smith, a husband and wife were convicted of breaking and entering
and larceny. The wife appealed on the ground that the lower court
erroneously denied her motion for nonsuit since the state's evidence
was insufficient to overcome the presumption that she was acting under
the dominion and constraint of her husband at the time of the alleged
crime. The court, affirming her conviction, held that she was not enti-
tled to the presumption of coercion since she had testified in her own
behalf.'6
In reaching its decision, the court in Smith relied principally on State
7. This common law presumption is not applicable to all crimes; further, as to which crimes
it will be applicable varies depending on the jurisdiction. For a discussion of the exceptions in the
various jurisdictions, see, Comment, 35 N.C.L. REV. 104 (1956).
8. 65 N.C. at 399.
9. 156 N.C. 648, 72 S.E. 590 (1911).
10. 166 N.C. 376, 81 S.E. 687 (1914).
11. Id. at 378, 81 S.E. at 689.
12. 244 N.C. 701, 94 S.E.2d 915 (1956).
13. 15 N.C. App. 362, 190 S.E.2d 270, cert. detL, 281 N.C. 762, 191 S.E.2d 363 (1972).
14. Id The supreme court reasoned that "if the presumption was not available in a trial for
murder, it is likewise not available in a trial for conspiracy to commit murder." 15 N.C. App. at
367, 190 S.E.2d at 273-74. See also, supra note 7, at 106.
15. 33 N.C. App. 511, 235 S.E.2d 860 (1970).
16. Id. at 519-20, 235 S.E.2d at 865-66.
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v. Seahorn,'7 interpreting Seahorn to hold that a wife is not entitled to
the benefit of the presumption when she testifies in her own behalf.'"
In Seahorn, the wife's counsel requested the court to instruct the jury
that if the wife had made illegal liquor sales in her husband's presence
and with his consent and approval, then she should be acquitted.' 9
However, the lower court refused to give the jury this instruction, rea-
soning that the wife had testified on her own behalf as to the circum-
stances of the sale and her own conduct. E" Instead, the court charged
the jury that "if you find that she was acting voluntarily in the sale of
liquor on this occasion, actually making the sales, or aiding and abet-
ting and assisting her husband, she was doing this willfully and deliber-
ately, you should find her guilty."'" The court then continued the
charge to the effect that if the jury found that the evidence showed
coercion by the husband over his wife, however, then the jury should
acquit the wife.22
The North Carolina Supreme Court found that the lower court's
charge in Seahorn was erroneous in that it failed to instruct that the law
presumed the wife acted under the coercion of her husband; but, in
affirming the wife's conviction, held the error was harmless since the
trial court's charge was substantially in compliance with State v.
Williams, and State v. Nowell; and further found that "the jury evi-
dently understood that they should not convict the feme defendant un-
less they were fully satisfied that the wife was acting voluntarily and
free from any constraint upon the part of her husband."23
A close examination of Seahorn reveals that its holding was that the
wife had in fact received the benefit of the presumption, regardless of
whether she was entitled to it; not that a wife is entitled to the benefit of
the presumption unless she testifies in her own behalf. While the lower
court had refused to give the defendant's requested instruction to the
jury because the wife had testified in her own behalf, the supreme court
noted that it was entirely proper to decline to give this instruction be-
cause "the defendant did not ask for any instruction about a presump-
tion."'2 The supreme court further noted that the wife had received the
benefit of the presumption, which is evident in the court's language
that, "we doubt, in view of all the circumstances and her own evidence,
if she was entitled to this artificial presumption, but if so, she received
17. 166 N.C. 373, 81 S.E. 687 (1914).
18. 33 N.C. App. at 519-20, 235 S.E.2d at 865-66.
19. 166 N.C. at 376, 81 S.E. at 688.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 377, 81 S.E. at 687.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 378, 81 S.E. at 688.
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the benefit of it."25 Therefore, though the lower court may have felt
that the wife was not entitled to the presumption where she testified in
her own behalf, and thought that by its charge to the jury, it was not
giving the wife the benefit of the presumption, the North Carolina
Supreme Court found that the wife had in fact received the benefit of
this common law presumption. The determination by the North Caro-
lina Court of Appeals in State v. Smith2 6 that Seahorn stood for the
proposition that a wife is not entitled to the presumption where she
testifies in her own behalf, is an erroneous conclusion based only on
dicta in the Seahorn decision that the wife may not have been entitled
to the presumption. There is no indication in Seahorn why the court
doubted the wife's entitlement to the presumption. This doubt could
have been due to her testifying in her own behalf. However, the court's
doubt may have been due to a feeling that the presumption no longer
serves a legitimate or useful purpose in light of changing circumstances.
The court's reason for its statement is only subject to speculation.
However, the fact remains that Seahorn held only that the trial court's
charge was sufficient to give the wife the benefit of the presumption.
The present North Carolina position on this common law doctrine
seems to be that the presumption is still available whenever a wife com-
mits a crime (with certain exceptions) 27 in the presence of her husband.
Thus, in State v. Smith,28 the wife was entitled to the presumption.
Consequently the court of appeals could have resolved the issue in only
one of three ways. First, the court could have held that the presump-
tion remained available, and reversed the lower court's decision for its
refusal to give the wife the benefit of it; secondly, the court could have
held that the presumption was no longer available; or thirdly, the court
could have held that the presumption was still available, but carved out
an exception for instances where a wife testified in her own behalf. As
the court in Smith erroneously held that, based on Seahorn, the pre-
sumption was not available to a wife who testified in her own behalf, a
reconsideration of this issue should be forthcoming, not only to decide
whether an exception was or should be created under which the pre-
sumption would be denied in such circumstances, but also to determine
the need for and justification of this presumption in light of present day
circumstances.
In making such a determination it is enlightening to compare how
other jurisdictions have dealt with this common law doctrine. A survey
of the fifty states expectedly reveals that the majority no longer adheres
25. Id.
26. 33 N.C. App. 511, 235 S.E.2d 860 (1977).
27. Supra note 7, at 105-07.
28. 33 N.C. App. 511, 235 S.E.2d 860.
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to the presumption or the defense of marital coercion. Generally,
twenty-five states have dealt legislatively with the doctrine;29 eighteen
states have dealt judicially with it;3" and as far as could be determined,
the remaining seven states have yet to deal with the issue legislatively
or judicially.31
Nineteen of the twenty-five states to deal legislatively with the doc-
trine have abolished not only the presumption, but also the defense of
marital coercion.32 Five of these states have enacted statutes providing
that even if a woman acts on the command of her husband, it is no
defense unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a gen-
eral defense of duress due to circumstances specified elsewhere in the
states' statutes.33 Illinois and Utah provide that "a married woman is
not entitled, by reason of the presence of her husband, to any presump-
tion of compulsion, or to any defense of compulsion except. . . "3 as
provided elsewhere by statute. Washington abrogated the presumption
by statute, stating "the defense of duress is not established solely by
showing that a married person acted on the command of his or her
spouse. ' 3' Eight of the nineteen states first enacted statutes which ab-
rogated the presumption, yet left the defense of marital coercion.36
These eight states have since repealed their provisions,37 with seven of
the states replacing them with general duress statutes, 38 and the eighth
29. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and Wisconsin.
30. Alabama, Florida, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vir-
ginia and West Virginia.
31. Alaska, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont and Wyo-
ming.
32. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Washington and
Wisconsin.
33. DEL. CODE tit. 11, § 43 l(c) (1974); HAW. REv. STAT. § 702-231 (c) (1976); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 161.270(3) (1975); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 8.05(e) (Vernon 1974); Wisc. STAT. ANN. §
939.46(2) (West Supp. 1972).
34. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 7-11(b) (Smith-Hurd 1972); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-302(3)
(Supp. 1977).
35. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.16.060(4) (1977).
36. ARIZ. REv. STAT. § 13-134 (1956) (repealed effective October 1, 1978); ARK. STAT. ANN.
§ 41-114 (1964) (repealed 1976); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(7) (amended 1976 by rewriting exception
(7)); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 40-1-808 (1963) (repealed 1972); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-401 to 402 (1953)
(repealed 1969); IDAHO CODE § 18-201(7) (1948) (repealed 1969); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 94-
201 (1947) (repealed 1974); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-5-3 (1967) (repealed 1977).
37. 1977 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 142, § 44; 1975 Ark. Acts No. 208, § 208; 1976 Cal. Stats. ch.
1181, § 1; 1971 Colo. Sess. Laws ch. 121, § 1, at 411; 1968 Ga. Laws 1249, 1274; 1969 Idaho Sess.
Laws ch. 204, § 1, at 599; 1973 Mont. Laws ch. 513, § 1; 1976 S.D. Sess. Laws ch. 158, § 5-2.
38. ARiz. REv. STAT. § 13-402 (Supp. 1977); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-208 (1976); COLO. REv.
STAT. 18-1-708 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. § 26-906 (1972); IDAHO CODE § 18-201(4) (Supp. 1977);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 94-3-110 (Supp. 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 22-5-1 (Supp.
1977).
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state enacting no replacement since it previously had a general duress
statute.39 Ohio and Pennsylvania have judicially held that both the
presumption and the defense of marital coercion have been abolished
by statutes.'0 Oklahoma, the remaining state of the nineteen to abolish
by legislation both the presumption and the defense of marital coer-
cion, previously had five separate statutes that, read together, statu-
torily provided both the presumption and the defense. 41 Three of the
five provisions have been repealed,42 and the fourth amended,43
thereby abolishing not only the presumption of coercion, but also elim-
inating the defense of marital coercion. Four of the twenty-five states to
deal with the issue legislatively have abolished the presumption, but
provided that proof of marital coercion; coercion is still a good de-
fense.44 The remaining two states of the twenty-five, Minnesota and
New York, previously had statutes that abolished both the presumption
and the defense of marital coercion; however, their statutes have since
been repealed.45 In both states, as it is provided that the common law
shall continue in effect except where abrogated by statute,46 it appears
that the presumption would still be available, though it is doubtful that
either state realized that the repeal of their respective statutes would
have this effect.47
39. CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(8) (West 1970) (amended 1976) (current version at CAL. PENAL
CODE § 26(7) (West Cum. Supp. 1976)).
40. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3103.0 (Page 1972), construed in Ohio v. Herschberger, 77
O.L.A. 487, 150 N.E.2d 671 (1958); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 309 (Purdon 1973), construed in
Commonwealth v. Lawson, 454 Pa. 23, 309 A.2d 371 (1973).
41. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 152(7) (West 1958) (provides that persons who commit a
criminal act under involuntary subjection to the power of a superior are incapable of committing a
crime); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 155(2) (West 1958) (provided that an inference of the involun-
tary subjection to the power of a superior would arise from coverture) (amended 1976 by omitting
subsection (2)); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 157 (West 1958) (listed certain crimes where an infer-
ence from coverture did not arise) (repealed 1976); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 158 (West 1958)
(provided that in those crimes specified in § 157, a wife must prove duress) (repealed 1976); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 159 (West 1958) (provided that the inference arising from the fact of cover-
ture may be rebutted) (repealed 1976).
42. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 157 to 159 (West 1958) (repealed 1976).
43. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 155(2) (West 1958) (amended 1976) (the 1958 statute pro-
vided that an inference of involuntary subjection to the power of a superior would arise from
duress or coverture) (OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 155 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-1978) now provides
that such an inference will arise only from duress).
44. MD. ANN. CODE art. 35, § 7 (1971); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 780.401 (MICH. STAT.
ANN. § 28.1071 (Callaghan 1972)); NEV. REv. STAT. § 194.010(8) (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:85-
3 (West 1969).
45. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 610.06 (West 1961) (repealed 1963); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1092 (Mc-
Kinney 1944) (repealed 1967).
46. Jung v. St. Paul Fire Relief Ass'n., 223 Minn. 402, 27 N.W.2d 151 (1947) (The common-
law is in force in Minnesota except where it has been abrogated by statute or is not adapted to the
conditions of the state); N.Y. CONST. art. 1, § 14. (The common-law shall be and continue the law
of the state of New York "subject to such alteration as the legislature shall make concerning the
same.").
47. The 1963 Advisory Committee Comment on MINN. STAT. ANN. § 610.06 (West 1961)
6
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Eleven of the eighteen states that have dealt with the doctrine judi-
cially, recognized the presumption and the defense of coercion the last
time the issue was before their courts.48 It should be noted however,
that with the exception of Missouri and North Carolina, none of these
states has faced the issue in over forty years.49 Therefore, in light of the
dates of these decisions, the majority trend to abolish the presumption,
and present day attitudes and circumstances, it is questionable whether
these jurisdictions would reaffirm this issue today. The remaining
seven states judicially abolished the presumption."0 It is uncertain,
however, whether the defense of marital coercion is still available. In
seven states, no reported court decision or legislation dealing with this
doctrine could be found.5 '
In conclusion, this writer urges that North Carolina judicially abol-
ish not only the presumption, but also the defense of marital coercion.
Chief Justice Clark, in his concurring opinion in State v. Seahorn1
2
over sixty years ago, stated that the presumption ". .. having been
created solely by judicial decision, should be set aside in the same
mode. . . . It might also be noted that a House Judiciary Commit-
(repealed 1963) states that the statute was premised on the assumption that in its absence the
courts would hold that a crime committed by a wife in the presence of her husband would be a
defense. The comment further states "[ilt is believed that no court would presently so hold in the
absence of statute."
48. Spencer v. State, 40 Ala. App. 168, 109 So.2d 756 (1958); Conner v. State, 95 Fla. 765, 117
So. 852 (1928); Tomasello v. State, 91 Ind. App. 670, 173 N.E. 235 (1930); State v. Hollis, 163 La.
952, 113 So. 159 (1927); State v. Cleaves, 59 Me. 298, 8 Am. Rep. 422 (1871); State v. Ready, 251
S.W.2d 680 (Mo. 1952); State v. Smith, 33 N.C. App. 511, 235 S.E.2d 860 (1977); State v. Shee, 13
R.I. 535 (1882); State v. Minor, 171 S.C. 120, 171 S.E. 737 (1934); Martin v. Commonwealth, 143
Va. 479, 129 S.E. 348 (1931); State v. Buchanan, II1 W. Va. 142, 160 S.E. 920 (1931).
49. The cases cited in note 43 supra, are the most recent decisions found for each state. It
should be noted however, that the Reporter's Comments, found with LA. Rv. STAT. ANN. § 14:18
(West 1974), a general duress provision, state that a provision to provide for the presumption of
marital coercion was considered but rejected as unnecessary believing that to indulge in such a
presumption would be absurd. Also LA. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 3 (West 1967) abrogated the
former rule that where there is no express law, the common law rules of procedure would prevail,
by providing that "[wihere no procedure is specifically prescribed by this Code or by statute, the
court may proceed in a manner consistent with the spirit of the provisions of the Code and other
statutory or constitutional provisions." Therefore it appears that Louisiana is no longer bound to
follow the common law in absence of statute, hence, it is uncertain exactly what its position would
be today.
50. State v. Bazoukas, 226 Iowa 1385, 286 N.W. 458 (1939); State v. Hendricks, 32 Kan. 559,
4 P. 1050 (1884); Wiremann v. Commonwealth, 224 Ky. 131, 5 S.W.2d 884 (1928); Common-
wealth v. Barnes, 76 Mass. Adv. Sh. 143, 340 N.E.2d 863 (1976); Smith v. Meyers, 54 Neb. 1, 74
N.W. 277 (1898); State v. Turnbow, 67 N.M. 241, 354 P.2d 533 (1960); Angel v. McClean, 1973
Tenn. 191, 116 S.W.2d 1005 (1938).
51. Alaska, Connecticut, Mississippi, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Vermont and Wyo-
ming.
52. 166 N.C. 373, 81 S.E. 687 (1914).
53. Id. at 379, 81 S.E. at 689. Chief Justice Clark used N.C. GEN. STAT. 52-6, which required
a privy examination of a married woman whenever she joined her husband in a conveyance of
real property, as an example of a statutory creation which could only be repealed by statute, (and
stated that such action should have long been taken), to stress that the judiciary, which created the
7
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tee54 and a Senate Judiciary Committee" of the North Carolina Gen-
eral Assembly have considered adding a new section to Chapter 14 of
the North Carolina General Statutes that would abolish the presump-
tion and the defense of marital coercion by the following language:
"Defense of compulsion and coercion-Any person charged with a crimi-
nal offense may assert the common-law defense of compulsion, but no
presumption of coercion shall arise because of the marriage relation-
ship alone."5 The statutory language was formulated by the Legisla-
tive Research Commission,57 which was directed by the 1975 General
Assembly to study the problem of sex discrimination in North Carolina
laws and practices.58 The committee's report to the 1977 General As-
sembly suggests that the changes enumerated in their report are war-
ranted in order to eliminate sex discrimination in the cases, laws,
customs, and practices in North Carolina.-9
KEVIN 0. EASLEY
presumption of marital coercion, is the proper body to abolish it. As the North Carolina Legisla-
ture repealed N.C. GEN. STAT. 52-6 by 1977 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 375, § 1, it appears the appropri-
ate time for the judiciary to take its respective action.
54. House Committee on Judiciary III, 1977 General Assembly of N.C.
55. Senate Committee on Judiciary II, 1977 General Assembly of N.C.
56. S.B. 353 and H.B. 1320, 1977 General Assembly of N.C. Both committees gave a
favorable report on their bill but postponed further action indefinitely. Consequently, under § 2
of S.J.R. 915, 1977 General Assembly of N.C., which provided for adjournment, any bill indefi-
nitely postponed may not be further considered without a joint resolution passed by a two-thirds
majority in each house.
57. This commission was established by N.C. GEN. STAT. 120-30.10 (1974) (amended 1975)
(current version at N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 120-30.10 to 30.18 (1974 and Cum. Supp. 1975)).
58. 1975 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 851, § 5.
59. N.C. LEGISLATIVE RESEARCH COMMISSION, REPORT ON SEX DISCRIMINATION 3 (1977).
8
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